Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite
  populations by Liu, Linjie et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
02
58
0v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  7
 M
ay
 20
17
Competitions between prosocial exclusions and punishments in finite
populations
Linjie Liu,1 Xiaojie Chen,1, ∗ and Attila Szolnoki2, †
1School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Electronic
Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
2Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science,
Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
Prosocial punishment has been proved to be a powerful mean to promote cooperation. Re-
cent studies have found that social exclusion, which indeed can be regarded as a kind of
punishment, can also support cooperation. However, if prosocial punishment and exclusion
are both present, it is still unclear which strategy is more advantageous to curb free-riders.
Here we first study the direct competition between different types of punishment and ex-
clusion. We find that pool (peer) exclusion can always outperform pool (peer) punishment
both in the optional and in the compulsory public goods game, no matter whether second-
order sanctioning is considered or not. Furthermore, peer exclusion does better than pool
exclusion both in the optional and in the compulsory game, but the situation is reversed
in the presence of second-order exclusion. Finally, we extend the competition among all
possible sanctioning strategies and find that peer exclusion can outperform all other strate-
gies in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, while pool exclusion prevails
when second-order sanctioning is possible. Our results demonstrate that exclusion is a more
powerful strategy than punishment for the resolution of social dilemmas.
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2Introduction
Cooperation is widespread in our world, which has a fundamental role on the evolution of hu-
man civilization [1–5]. However, cooperation is vulnerable to be invaded by selfish individuals
who are always maximizing their short-term and immediate interests. Thus how to overcome such
individuals is a vital task for the emergence of cooperation in a population [6–8]. Several mech-
anisms, such as spatial reciprocity, reputation, wisdom of groups, and costly punishment, have
been demonstrated to be effective for cooperators to fight against defectors [9–15]. Staying at the
last option, costly punishment has received considerable attention in the last decade because of its
importance and widespread prevalence in human societies [16–19]. By using public goods game
(PGG), which is a standard metaphor of social dilemmas, many theoretical and experimental stud-
ies have shown that prosocial punishment can reduce the number of free-riders and encourage the
majority of individuals to contribute to the common pool [20–23].
As an alternative incentive tool to prevent free-riders exploiting community effort, social ex-
clusion can also be observed in human societies [24–26]. It is based on the idea that convicted
offenders are denied certain rights and benefits of citizenship or membership of joint ventures
[27]. Accordingly, individuals who are identified to violate the rule or jeopardize others’ common
interests could be excluded from the community [28–31]. In this way exclusion serves as a sort
of institution to tame defectors not to exploit others. Previous studies have shown that social ex-
clusion can increase social sensitivity [32–36] and induce a positive impact on cooperation when
partners are fixed [37, 38]. Recently, Sasaki and Uchida introduced peer exclusion into the PGG
and established a game-theoretical model to study the evolution of social exclusion by using repli-
cator equations in infinite populations [39]. They found that peer exclusion can overcome two
shortages of peer punishment: first, a rare punishing cooperator barely subverts the asocial society
of free-riders; second, natural selection often eliminates punishing cooperators in the presence of
non-punishing cooperators (namely, second-order free-riders). Subsequently, Li et al. [40] studied
the comparison between peer exclusion and pool exclusion, and claimed that peer excluders can
overcome pool excluders if the exclusion costs are small and excluders can dominate the whole
population in a suitable parameters range in the presence of second-order free-riders. Note that
pool excluder, similarly to pool punisher, pays a fixed, permanent cost before contributing to the
public goods to maintain an institutionalized mechanism for punishing exploiters.
To summarize our present knowledge, both prosocial exclusion and prosocial punishment have
3been proved to be effective ways for promoting cooperation, but their systematic comparison is
still missing. Indeed, the mentioned works [39, 40] have compared their independent impacts on
the cooperation level, but the consequence of their simultaneous presence is still unexplored. It
remained unclear which strategy is more evolutionary advantageous if both exclusion and punish-
ment are simultaneously available for individuals in the population. We wonder if exclusion or
punishment is a better way to curb free-riding. How does their relation change if second-order
sanctioning is also possible? In the latter case non-punishing individuals or those who deny con-
tribution to the cost of exclusion may also be punished. Furthermore, we also wonder whether
peer punishment (peer exclusion) or pool punishment (pool exclusion) is more efficient individual
strategy to control transgressors for a higher well-being.
Motivated by these open problems, in this study we focus on the competition between prosocial
exclusion and punishment in finite populations who play the PGG. We first investigate the direct
competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment, and demonstrate that pool exclusion has
the evolutionary advantage over pool punishment both in the optional and in the compulsory PGG,
no matter whether second-order exclusion and punishment are considered or not. We then inves-
tigate the competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment, and find that peer exclusion
is evolutionarily advantageous over peer punishment both in the optional and in the compulsory
PGG, independently of the choice of second-order sanctioning. Third, we study the competition
between pool exclusion and peer exclusion, and observe that peer exclusion can outperform pool
exclusion both in the optional and in the compulsory PGG if second-order exclusion is ignored,
while the situation is reversed in the presence of second-order exclusion. Finally, we investigate
the full competition of all previously mentioned strategies, such as pool exclusion, peer exclusion,
pool punishment, and peer punishment. As our main observation, it turns out that peer exclusion
is the most advantageous strategy in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, but
pool exclusion outperforms other strategies when second-order sanctioning is possible.
Model
We consider the standard PGG in a finite, well-mixed population with size M . In each round
of the game, N ≥ 2 individuals are selected randomly from the population to form a group for
participating in a one-shot game. Then, each individual in the group decides whether or not to
contribute an amount of cost c to the common pool. The individual who is willing to contribute
4is called a cooperator, and the individual who does not contribute is called a defector. In the
optional PGG we also consider a third option, a strategy which gives up participating in the game,
hence is called as a loner. The latter strategy has a constant payoff σ which is not affected by
others. The sum of the contributions to the common pool is multiplied by the enhancement factor
r (1 < r < N), and then equally allocated among all individuals who participated in the game no
matter they contributed or not. In agreement with previous works [41, 42], if only one individual
participates in the game then her income equals with σ.
In the second stage of the game exclusion or/and punishment is considered where both related
strategies contribute c to the common pool. By following Refs. [21, 43] peer punishers impose
a fine β on each free-rider in their group at a cost γ. Accordingly, each defector will be fined an
amount βNW , where NW is the number of peer punishers in the group. Pool punishers, however,
pay a permanent cost G to the punishment pool beforehand. If there exist defectors in the group,
they will be fined an amount BNV , where NV is the number of pool punishers in the group. It
simply means that the additional cost of pool punisher is independent of the number of defectors
in the group, while the related cost of peer punisher is proportional to the presence of defectors. If
considering second-order punishment, second-order free-riders (individuals who contribute to the
game but do not bear the extra cost of punishment) will be fined the same amount [21].
When exclusion is applied we follow conceptually similar protocol as for punishment. Here
exclusion serves as a sort of institution to prevent defectors to exploit other group members. Hence
the role of excluder can be viewed as a sentinel who alarms other group members about the danger
of defectors. Evidently, such an extra effort requires additional cost which is paid by excluder
player. Consequently, a peer excluder does not only contribute c to the public goods game but
also pay a cost cE after every defector in the group to prevent them collecting benefit from the
public goods sharing. In stark contrast to peer exclusion, pool excluders pay a permanent cost δ
to maintain the institution of exclusion which will block defectors to gain benefit from PGG in the
presence of pool excluders. As previously, in case of the second-order exclusion, second-order
free-riders (individuals who do not take the extra cost of exclusion) will also be excluded.
In order to study the evolutionary dynamics, we use the so-called pairwise comparison rule with
the mutation-selection process [44, 45]. According to this protocol at each time step a randomly
chosen player imay change her strategy. We consider the possibility of mutation, hence the player
adopts a randomly chosen available strategy with probability µ. Alternatively, which happens with
5probability 1− µ, a player i tries to imitate a randomly chosen player j with a probability
f(Πj − Πi) =
1
1 + exp−κ(Πj−Πi)
. (1)
Here Πi and Πj are the collected payoffs of the mentioned players i and j, while κ characterizes
the intensity of selection. In the κ → ∞ strong imitation limit the more successful player j
always succeeds in enforcing her strategy to player i, but never otherwise. On the other hand,
κ → 0 indicates the so-called weak selection limit where strategy adoption becomes random
independently of the payoff values. In between these extremes, at a finite value of κ, it is likely
that a better performing player j is imitated, but it is still not impossible to adopt her strategy when
performing worse.
In the following we consider four different scenarios when punishment and exclusion compete
and we compute the resulting stationary distribution of all available strategies. We suppose a well-
mixed finite population where all players interact with each other randomly. To make comparison
with previous works easier we have adopted notations for variables by earlier works [21, 39].
Accordingly, let X denote the number of cooperators who contribute to the public pool, but do
not bear the cost of punishment or exclusion; Y the number of defectors who contribute neither
to PGG nor to the sanctions; Z the number of loners; V the number of pool punishers; W the
number of peer punishers; F the number of pool excluders; and E the number of peer excluders.
The whole size of population is denoted byM and N randomly chosen individuals are offered to
form a group and establish a joint enterprise. In the next section we present the results of the more
complex optional PGG while further details and results for the simplified compulsory PGG game
are summarized in the Supplementary Information (SI).
Results
Competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment
We first study the direct competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment in the op-
tional PGG. In this scenario, there are five available strategies in the population fulfilling the
constraintX+Y +Z+F +V = M . We assume that 0 < σ < rc−c−δ and 0 < σ < rc−c−G,
which ensure that a punisher or excluder can get higher profit than a loner if there is more than one
6participant in the group. In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment only defectors
are sanctioned by punishment or/and exclusion. In Fig. 1(a) we plot the long-run frequencies for
each strategy which determine the stationary distribution of all available strategies in dependence
of imitation strength κ. We find that for κ < 10−4 the frequencies of the five competing strategies
are identical due to the practically random imitation process. As we increase the strength of imi-
tation then all the five strategies can survive and coexist. More precisely, in the perfect imitation
limit the system evolves towards a homogeneous state, where the flips between almost homoge-
neous states are triggered by rare mutations. (A representative trajectory of evolution can be seen
in Fig. 1 in Ref. [21].) In this way the presented frequencies of stationary states are calculated from
the time average of frequencies for competing strategies. As Fig. 1(a) suggests pure cooperators
form the highest portion who can enjoy the benefit of exclusion and punishment without paying
their costs. Interestingly, the second largest population is formed by pool-excluders followed by
defectors and loners, while pool-punishers can make up the smallest fraction, or can be detected
with the smallest probability. This result suggests that pool exclusion is more effective against
defection and has an evolutionary advantage over pool-punishment strategy. In particular, in the
strong imitation (κ→∞) limit the long-run frequencies in the [X, Y, Z, F, V ] subpopulations are
3
8
, 3
16
, 1
8
, 4M+5
16M+32
, and M+5
16M+32
, respectively (for further details, see Section 1 in SI).
The comparison of stationary strategies in Fig. 1(a) emphasizes that it is better to cooperate but
also to avoid the additional cost of sanctions. Needless to say, if everyone chose this option then we
would face the original dilemma. To minimize this undesired consequence of “second-order free-
riders” we may penalize those who refuse participating in the sanctioning process. In particular,
when second-order exclusion and punishment are considered, we assume that pool-excluders drive
out all strategies who do not contribute to the exclusion pool. In parallel, pool-punishers will also
punish those who do not bear the additional cost of punishment pool. By applying this scenario,
we observe that the long-run frequencies in the [X, Y, Z, F, V ] subpopulations are [0, 0, 0, 1, 0] for
κ > 10−3, as shown in Fig. 1(b). In other words, when second-order sanctioning is allowed pool-
excluders prevail and all other strategies extinct during the evolutionary process. To answer our
original question both panels plotted in Fig. 1 highlight that pool-exclusion is a more advantageous
strategy than pool-punishment independently of second-order sanctioning is considered or not. We
should stress that our observation remains valid for a broad range of parameter interval including
the level of the punishment fine or the group size. Furthermore, conceptually identical conclusion
can be made if the compulsory PGG is assumed where loner strategy cannot compete (the related
7results are presented in Sec. 2 of SI).
Competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment
In this subsection, we investigate the competition between peer punishment and peer exclusion
in the optional PGG. According to this scenario there are also five available strategies in the popu-
lation whose fractions fulfillX+Y +Z+E+W =M . In the absence of second-order punishment
and exclusion, we assume that 0 < cE <
rc−c
N−1
, which ensures that a single peer excluder can in-
vade a group of all defectors. In Fig. 2(a) we present the long-run frequencies of the five strategies
as a function of the imitation strength κ. As expected, for weak selection, when κ < 10−4, the
frequencies of the five strategies are practically identical because of the random strategy updating.
By increasing the imitation strength κ peer excluder strategy becomes gradually dominant and
occupies the majority of the population. Peer punisher strategy can only reach the second best
position in the rank of strategies. In the strong imitation limit the long-run frequencies for the
[X, Y, Z, E,W ] subpopulations are [ 6
5M+23
, 3
5M+23
, 2
5M+23
, 3M+6
5M+23
, 2M+6
5M+23
] (see Section. 3 of SI).
This suggests that the number of peer excluders is about 1.5 times larger in time average than the
second best peer punishers for large population size, hence demonstrating the superiority of the
former strategy.
If second-order sanctioning is allowed then the relation of sanctioning strategies becomes even
more unambiguous. Interestingly, in this case excluders do not only ostracize pure cooperators but
also punishers who refuse to contribute to the cost of exclusion. But the penalty works also in the
reversed direction because punishers lower the payoff of both cooperation and exclusion strategies.
The consequence of this mutual sanctioning is summarized in Fig. 2(b), which suggests that peer
exclusion prevails and gives no space for any other strategies. This observation supports our
previous conclusion about the effectiveness of exclusion that is not restricted to pool strategies, but
is still valid for peer strategies. We stress that this conclusion remains unchanged if we release the
restriction for the value of cE, which means that for cE >
rc−c
N−1
peer exclusion has still evolutionary
advantage over peer punishment. The border within this observation is valid can be extended
further because peer exclusion outperforms peer punishment in the compulsory PGG, no matter
whether second-order sanctioning is applied or not (for more details see Section 4 in SI).
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In the following subsection we compare the peer- and pool-exclusion strategies in the optional
PGG, which are proved to be more effective than their punishing mates in the previously studied
cases. Here, there are five available strategies in the population whose fractions fulfill the con-
straintX + Y +Z +F +E = M . For their proper comparison we assume that their costs remain
below the previously established limit, that is 0 < cE <
rc−c
N−1
and 0 < σ < rc − c − δ. First,
we consider the case when second-order exclusion is not allowed, hence both excluder strategies
penalize pure defectors only. Fig. 3(a) illustrates that peer excluder strategy becomes dominant as
we gradually increase the imitation strength. All the other strategies can share a reasonable portion
only at an intermediate value κ. If the imitation strength exceeds the threshold κ > 10−1 then the
long-run frequencies of defectors, loners, and pool excluders are close to zero, and only coopera-
tors can coexist with peer excluders. In particular, the fractions of [X, Y, Z, F, E] strategies in the
strong imitation (κ → ∞) limit are [ 9
6M+25
, 3
6M+25
, 2
6M+25
, 2
6M+25
, 6M+9
6M+25
] (further details can be
seen in Section 5 of SI). These results suggest that peer excluder strategy is able to dominate the
whole population in the absence of second-order exclusion.
Interestingly, the outcome of evolutionary trajectory is completely reversed if second-order ex-
clusion is considered. In this case, in strong agreement with a previous work where peer- and
pool-punisher strategies were compared [21], pool excluders are capable to crowd out peer ex-
cluders. The result of this competition is summarized in Fig. 3(b) where the long-run frequen-
cies for each strategy are plotted. In the strong imitation limit the victory of pool excluders
is total, yielding [0, 0, 0, 1, 0] fractions for X, Y, Z, F , and E strategies respectively. As in the
previous cases, these results remain valid if the compulsory PGG is played. Here, in the ab-
sence of loners, peer-excluders dominate when second-order exclusion is not considered yielding
[ 4
3M+11
, 2
3M+11
, 1
3M+11
, 3M+4
3M+11
] values for the competing X, Y, F , and E strategies in the strong
imitation limit (details can be found in Sec. 6 of SI). When second-order exclusion is possible then
the pool excluder strategy prevails in close agreement with the result of optional PGG.
Competition between prosocial exclusions and punishments
The pair comparison of competing strategies may provide a first guide about their relations,
but the presence of a third party could be a decisive factor, which may completely rearrange the
ranks of competitors. To clarify this possibility in the following we explore the simultaneous
9competitions of all previously studied strategies. Namely, we consider an optional PGG where
seven strategies, namely pure cooperator, defector, loner, peer excluder, peer punisher, pool ex-
cluder, and pool punisher are present. As in the previous cases, we first consider the option when
second-order sanctions are not applied hence only defectors suffer from the presence of excluders
and punishers. Fig. 4(a) summarizes our results, which suggest that “peer-sactioning” strategies
are the most effective, but more importantly, peer excluders can dominate the population. In this
way the dominance of peer excluders over peer punishers is not disturbed by the presence of
other sanctioning strategies such as pool excluders or pool punishers. As Fig. 4(a) shows all the
other strategies become irrelevant in the strong imitation limit. In particular, the long-run frequen-
cies of X, Y, Z, E,W, F and V subpopulations are 45
163+35M
, 15
163+35M
, 6
163+35M
, 20M+45
163+35M
, 15M+45
163+35M
,
18M+7
(163+35M)(3M+2)
, and 3M+7
(163+35M)(3M+2)
, respectively (further details can be seen in Section 7 of SI).
This result suggests that only the sanctioning strategies survive in the large population limit where
the majority of individuals are peer excluders in most of the time.
In the next logical step we consider the case when second-order sanctioning is possible. This
option offers an extremely complex food-web between competing strategies, because practically
all sanctioning strategies try to beat all the others. For instance, pool excluders ostracize not only
defectors and simple cooperators, but also peer excluders, peer punishers, and pool punishers. In
this “almost everybody beats everybody else” battle the final victor is pool excluder strategy. This
case is plotted in Fig. 4(b) where the resulting fractions of the strategies are [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] in
the strong imitation limit (further details can be seen in Sec. 7 of SI).
To close this section we briefly summarize the results of the compulsory PGG where 6 com-
peting strategies remain. The details of the calculation can be found in Sec. 8 of SI. In the
absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, we find that the behaviour is conceptu-
ally similar to the one we observed for the optional PGG. Here peer excluders and peer pun-
ishers perform the best, but all the other strategies survive at intermediate strength of imita-
tion. In the strong imitation limit the resulting fractions of X, Y, E,W, F , and V strategies are
[ 6
5M+22
, 3
5M+22
, 3M+6
5M+22
, 2M+6
5M+22
, 3M+1
(5M+22)(3M+2)
, 1
(5M+22)(3M+2)
], which suggests that only sanction-
ing strategies survive in the large-population limit. When second-order exclusion and punishment
are possible then we get back the result obtained previously for the optional PGG: only pool ex-
cluders survive for strong enough imitation strength.
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Discussion
Penalizing free-riders whose behaviour threaten the collective efforts seems almost inevitable. But
which sanctioning tool shall we apply to reach our goal efficiently? To punish them by lowering
their payoffs or to deny their rights to enjoy the benefit of public goods? The answer could be
even more complicated because both peer and pool sanctioning can be used. While peer punishers
and peer excluders invest an extra cost only in the presence of defectors, pool punisher and pool
excluder strategies apply a permanent effort to maintain the sanctioning institutions. Based on
previous works both punishment and exclusion seem to be appropriate methods [21, 46], but their
systematic comparison has not been done yet.
In this work, we have thus studied the competitions between costly punishments and exclusions
in finite populations playing the PGG by using different scenarios. For a fair comparison we have
applied equally high cost of punishment and exclusion. We have found that peer exclusion is al-
ways favored by natural selection when it competes with peer punishment both in the optional and
in the compulsory PGG, independently of second-order punishment and exclusion are considered
or not. Conceptually similar findings have been obtained for pool exclusion when it directly com-
petes with pool punishment. Furthermore, when peer exclusion competes with pool exclusion,
peer exclusion wins in the absence of second-order exclusion, while pool exclusion prevails when
second-order exclusion is applied. Lastly, we have also explored the most complex option when all
four sanctioning methods compete with the pure cooperator, defector, and loner strategies. In the
latter case peer exclusion is proved to be the most viable tool in the absence of second-order pun-
ishment and exclusion, while pool exclusion prevails when second-order sanctioning is allowed.
To sum up, the systematic comparison of sanctioning strategies highlights that exclusion is always
a more effective way to control free-riders than punishment, but the absence or the presence of
second-order sanctioning could be a decisive factor, because the former condition supports peer
exclusion while the latter option helps pool exclusion strategy to prevail.
We would like to stress that our finding is robust and remains valid in a broad range of model
parameters (some representative plots are given in Sec. 9 of SI). For instance, if we increase the
punishment fine by fixing the cost of punishment then the superiority of exclusion is still not in
danger. In general, if the fine is not unrealistically high and the cost of exclusion does not exceed
the cost of punishment then exclusion strategy always performs better similarly to the cases we
discussed earlier. Indeed, we have verified that in the absence of second-order sanctioning the
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exclusion strategy still has an evolutionary advantage over the punishment strategy, no matter an
enhanced fine value applied by peer and pool punishers. To give an example, the outcomes remain
conceptually intact when the punishment fine exceeds eight times the punishment cost. But if
second-order sanctioning is applied at such severe punishment then the advantage of excluders di-
minishes because their payoff becomes negative, which implies the victory of punishers. However,
we should note that applying such a severe punishment is not an attractive feature when humans
qualify potential social partners [47]. We have also considered different group sizes and found that
it has no significant role in the competition of sanctioning strategies (this is demonstrated clearly
in Fig. S7 of SI).
In order to provide a convenient framework for studying the competitions between costly ex-
clusions and punishments, we focused on the option when free-riders are always exiled in the
presence of excluders who have to bear the related cost. A further step could be when this sanc-
tion is not perfect and exclusion happens in a probabilistic manner [39, 40]. Indeed, previous
works emphasized the value of probabilistic sanctioning [19, 48], which opens promising avenue
for future studies. Our work can be also extended where the error of perception, i.e. defectors are
identified with some ambiguity, or the error of punishment or exclusion are also considered. In the
latter cases innocent players are punished or excluded from the joint venture by mistake. To con-
sider anti-social punishment and anti-social exclusion may also open interesting research avenue
to explore the effectiveness of exclusion [49–51]. Lastly, we note that our calculation is restricted
to the simplest, well-mixed population because of the extremely high number of competing strate-
gies. However, it is a frequently discussed fact that in structured populations, where interaction
topology is considered, the evolutionary outcomes could be significantly different from those pre-
sented for mean-field systems [52–57]. Therefore, we expect similar exciting new observations
from related efforts which will hopefully make our understanding more accurate.
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FIG. 1: The competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment in the optional PGG. Without
second-order exclusion or punishment, shown in panel (a), the frequency of pool excluders is significantly
higher than the portion of pool punishers, but all strategies can coexist in time average. In the presence of
second-order exclusion and punishment, presented in panel (b), pool excluders prevail and dominate in the
strong selection limit. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1, M = 100, δ = 0.4, and
G = B = 0.4.
FIG. 2: The competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment in the optional PGG. In the ab-
sence of second-order sanctioning, shown in panel (a), both strategies survive but peer exclusion dominates.
If second-order exclusion and punishment are applied then peer excluders prevail, as shown in panel (b).
Both the cost and fine of punishment are equal. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1,
M = 100, cE = 0.4, and β = γ = 0.4
FIG. 3: The competition between pool exclusion and peer exclusion in the optional PGG. In the absence
of second-order exclusion, peer excluders prevail, shown in panel (a). Panel (b) shows the opposite case
which happens if second-order exclusion is applied. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1,
M = 100, and cE = δ = 0.4.
FIG. 4: The competition between different types of social exclusion and costly punishment in the
optional PGG. When strategies can penalize defectors only, shown in panel (a), then all strategies coexist
in time average for weak strength of imitation, but in most of the time peer excluders form the majority of
the population for other imitation strength values. Panel (b) shows the case when second-order sanctioning
is possible. Here pool excluders prevail and conquer the whole population. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3,
c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1,M = 100, cE = δ = 0.4, β = γ = 0.4, and B = G = 0.4.
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2In the Supplementary Information (SI), we provide the specific analysis for the strategy dis-
tribution in the finite population with size M by elaborating eight different scenarios. In order
to calculate the stationary distribution of more than two strategies in our study, we consider that
the mutation probability µ is sufficiently small that is in agreement with previous works [1–4].
Consequently, the population will never contain more than two different strategies simultaneously,
and the population can evolve into a homogeneous state where all individuals adopt the same strat-
egy because the time between two mutation events is long enough. This assumption allows us to
approximate the evolutionary dynamics by means of an embedded Markov chain whose states cor-
respond to the different homogeneous states of the population. If the number of available strategies
is denoted by d then the state transition matrix which describes the different transition probabilities
for the population to move from one state to the other is given by
A = [ahq]d×d,
where ahq is the probability that the system switches from the h state (where all individuals adopt
strategy h) to the q state (where all individuals adopt strategy q) after the emergence of a single
mutation). Here ahq =
ρhq
d−1
if h 6= q and ahq = 1 −
∑
q 6=h
ρhq
d−1
otherwise, where ρhq is the fixation
probability that a single individual with strategy q takes over a resident population of individuals
with strategy h. The stationary distribution of the population can be calculated from the average
fraction of time that population spends in each of the homogeneous states. Technically, it is given
by the normalized left eigenvector of the eigenvalue 1 of the transition matrix A.
The fixation probability ρhq can be calculated as follows. We assume that in a finite population
with sizeM there are H individuals using strategy h and Q = M −H individuals using strategy
q. Then the probability that the number of individuals who use strategy h increases/decreases by
one is
T±(H) =
H
M
M −H
M
1
1 + exp∓κ(Πhq−Πqh)
,
where Πhq and Πqh are the average payoffs of individuals with strategy h and with strategy q, de-
pending on the numbers H and Q. Correspondingly, the fixation probability ρhq can be expressed
by
ρhq =
1
1 +
∑M−1
m=1
∏m
Q=1
T−(H)
T+(H)
=
1
1 +
∑M−1
m=1 exp
[κ
∑m
Q=1(Πhq−Πqh)]
.
31 Competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment in the optional PGG
First, we calculate the average payoffs for each strategy in a finite population assuming that
M individuals consist of X cooperators, Y defectors, Z loners, F pool excluders, and V pool
punishers. Thus the probability to find no pool excluders in the population is
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) .
Accordingly, the average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c)
+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
k=0
N−k−1∑
j=0
(
M−Y−Z−F−1
N−j−k−1
)(
Y
j
)(
Z
k
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k)c
N − k
− c]},
where k represents the number of loners, and j represents the number of defectors in the group.
Defectors are not only excluded by pool excluders, but also punished by pool punishers. Thus, the
average payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−(N − 1)V B
M − 1
] +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
k=0
(
M−Y−X−Z−F
N−i−j−k−1
)(
Y−1
j
)(
Z
k
)(
X
i
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k − 1)c
N − k
− (N − i− j − k − 1)B]},
where i represents the number of cooperators. The average payoff for loners is
ΠZ = σ.
The average payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c− δ).
Finally, the pool punishers’ payoff is
ΠV =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c−G)
+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−j−1∑
k=0
(
M−F−Y−Z−1
N−j−k−1
)(
Y
j
)(
Z
k
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k)c
N − k
− c−G]}.
4In what follows, we calculate the elements of the transition matrixA to determine the stationary
distribution of the population. First, we calculate the payoff expressions Πhq of strategy type h
competing against type q for all the possible pairs, which are the followings.
ΠXY =
N−1∑
i=0
(
X−1
i
)(
M−X
N−i−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [r(i+ 1)c
N
− c] =
rc
N
[
(N − 1)(X − 1)
M − 1
+ 1]− c,
ΠY X =
N−1∑
i=0
(
X
i
)(
M−X−1
N−i−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ric
N
=
rc
N
(N − 1)X
M − 1
,
ΠXZ =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) = rc− c−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)(rc− c− σ),
ΠZX = ΠZY = ΠZF = ΠZV = σ,
ΠXF = ΠXV = rc− c,
ΠFX = ΠFY = ΠFV = rc− c− δ,
ΠV X = ΠV F = rc− c−G,
ΠY F = 0,
ΠY Z =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ,
ΠY V =
(N − 1)V
M − 1
(
rc
N
−B),
ΠFZ = rc− c− δ −
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)(rc− c− δ − σ),
ΠV Y =
rc
N
[
(N − 1)(V − 1)
M − 1
+ 1]− c−G,
ΠV Z = rc− c−G−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)(rc− c−G− σ).
Based on the above payoff expressions, we can give the embedded Markov chain describing the
transition between cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), pool excluders (F ), and pool ex-
cluders (V ) as 

IX
ρXY
4
ρXZ
4
ρXF
4
ρXV
4
ρY X
4
IY
ρY Z
4
ρY F
4
ρY V
4
ρZX
4
ρZY
4
IZ
ρZF
4
ρZV
4
ρFX
4
ρFY
4
ρFZ
4
IF
ρFV
4
ρV X
4
ρV Y
4
ρV Z
4
ρV F
4
IV


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
4
, andK,L ∈ {X, Y, Z, F, V }. Correspondingly, we can determine the
long-run frequency for each strategy as a function of the imitation strength κ [see Fig. 1(a)].
5In the strong imitation limit the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions matrix is
simplified as 

3
4
1
4
0 0 0
0 1
2
1
4
1
4
0
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
1
4
0 0 3
4
− 1
4M
1
4M
1
4
0 0 1
4M
3
4
− 1
4M


.
Accordingly, the stationary distribution is [3
8
, 3
16
, 1
8
, 4M+5
16M+32
, M+5
16M+32
], which demonstrates that all
the five strategists can coexist, but the frequency of pool punishers is significantly lower than pool
excluders.
In the presence of second-order exclusion and punishment, we assume that pool excluders ex-
clude pool punishers, pure cooperators, and defectors. And pool punishers punish pool excluders,
pure cooperators, and defectors. The average payoffs for defectors and loners are not changed.
But the average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)V B
M − 1
]+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
N−1−i−k∑
p=0
(
M−X−Y−F−Z
p
)(
Z
k
)(
X−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−k−p−1
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ p+ 1)
N − k
− c− pB]},
where p represents the number of pool punishers in the group. The average payoff for pool ex-
cluders is given by
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
N−1−i−k∑
p=0
(
M−X−Y−V−Z−1
N−i−k−p−1
)(
Z+Y
k
)(
X
i
)(
V
p
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [ rc(N − k)
N − i− p− k
−c− δ − pB].
Last, the payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](−c−G)+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
N−1−i−k∑
p=0
(
M−X−Y−F−Z−1
p
)(
Z
k
)(
X
i
)(
Y
N−i−k−p−1
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ p+ 1)
N − k
− c−G]}.
Again, the transition matrix between cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), pool excluders
6(F ), and pool punishers (V ) can be simplified in the strong imitation limit as


1
2
1
4
0 1
4
0
0 1
2
1
4
1
4
0
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
4
3
4


.
The resulting stationary distribution is [0, 0, 0, 1, 0], which suggests that pool excluders prevail
[results are summarized in Fig. 1(b)].
2 Competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment in the compulsory PGG
In this section we assume that the population contains X cooperators, Y defectors, F pool
excluders, and V pool punishers from which N individuals are selected randomly to play the
PGG. In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, a cooperator obtains the average
payoff as
ΠX = [1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−Y−F−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−1
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [r(i+ 1)c
N
− c]
= rc[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (N − 1)Y
N(M − F − 1)
]− c.
The payoff for defectors is
ΠY = [1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
N−1∑
p=0
(
M−V−1
N−p−1
)(
V
p
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (−pB) +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−1−j∑
p=0
(
M−Y−F−V
N−j−p−1
)(
V
p
)(
Y−1
j
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − 1)c
N
− pB]
= −
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (N − 1)[FV NB − (M − F − Y )rc(M − 1)]
N(M − F − 1)(M − 1)
−
(N − 1)V B
M − 1
.
The payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF = rc− c− δ.
Finally, the payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV = rc− c−G−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc(N − 1)Y
N(M − F − 1)
.
7For small mutation rate, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between coop-
erators (X), defectors (Y ), pool excluders (F ), and pool punishers (V ) is given by


IX
ρXY
3
ρXF
3
ρXV
3
ρY X
3
IY
ρY F
3
ρY V
3
ρFX
3
ρFY
3
IF
ρFV
3
ρV X
3
ρV Y
3
ρV F
3
IV


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
3
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, F, V }.
For strong imitation, we set that δ = G, then the transition matrix is given by


2
3
1
3
0 0
0 2
3
1
3
0
1
3
0 2
3
− 1
3M
1
3M
1
3
0 1
3M
2
3
− 1
3M


.
In this case the resulting stationary distribution is [1
3
, 1
3
, M+1
3M+6
, 1
3M+6
]. It suggests that pool punish-
ers become extinct for large population size, and the surviving three strategies beat each other by
forming a Rock-Paper-Scissors-like cyclic dominance [see Fig. S1(a)].
In the presence of second-order exclusion and punishment, we assume that pool excluders
exclude pool punishers, pure cooperators, and defectors. Similarly, pool punishers punish pool
excluders, pure cooperators, and defectors. While the payoff for defectors remains unchanged, the
average payoff for cooperators is modified by
ΠX = −c−
(N − 1)V B
M − 1
+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) {−NFV B(N − 1) + rc(M − 1)[N(M − F − 1)− (N − 1)Y ]
N(M − 1)(M − F − 1)
}.
The payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
N−1∑
l=0
N−l−1∑
i=0
N−i−l−1∑
p=0
(
M−X−Y−V−1
l
)(
X
i
)(
V
p
)(
Y
N−i−p−l−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [r(i+ l + p+ 1)c
l + 1
− c− pB − δ],
where l represents the number of pool excluders in the group. Last, the payoff for pool punishers
is
ΠV = −c−G+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc− rc(N − 1)Y
N(M − F − 1)
].
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FIG. S1: (Color online) The competition between pool exclusion and pool punishment in the compulsory
PGG. In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, punishers become extinct, and the other
three strategies can coexist in time average (a). In the presence of second-order exclusion and punishment,
pool excluders can occupy the whole population (b). Parameters: N = 5,M = 100, c = 1, r = 3,G = 0.4,
δ = 0.4, and B = 0.4.
The simplified transition matrix in the strong imitation limit is


1
3
1
3
1
3
0
0 2
3
1
3
0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1
3
2
3


,
which yields the stationary distribution [0, 0, 1, 0]. This distribution shows that pool excluders
prevail, as shown in Fig. S1(b).
3 Competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment in the optional PGG
In the following let us assume that there are E peer excluders and W peer punishers in the
population, and we have X + Y + Z + E +W = M . We set that the exclusion probability is 1,
then the probability that no peer excluders are found in the population is given by
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) .
Accordingly, in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment the average payoff for
9cooperators is
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N − k
− c]}
The payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−(N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
]
+
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−1−j∑
t=0
N−j−t−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−Y−Z−W
N−t−k−j−1
)(
W
t
)(
Z
k
)(
Y−1
j
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(N − 1− j − k)
N − k
− tγ]},
where t represents the number of peer punishers. The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][rc− c− (N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
].
Last, peer punishers’ payoff is
ΠW =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{rc− c− N − 1
M − 1
Y β −
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc− c− (N − 1)Y β
M − 1
−
N−1∑
j=0
N−j−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−Y−Z−1
N−j−k−1
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) (N − j − k
N − k
rc− c− jβ)]}.
The embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between cooperators (X), defectors
(Y ), loners (Z), peer excluders (E), and peer punishers (W ) is given by


IX
ρXY
4
ρXZ
4
ρXE
4
ρXW
4
ρY X
4
IY
ρY Z
4
ρY E
4
ρY W
4
ρZX
4
ρZY
4
IZ
ρZE
4
ρZW
4
ρEX
4
ρEY
4
ρEZ
4
IE
ρEW
4
ρWX
4
ρWY
4
ρWZ
4
ρWE
4
IW


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
4
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, Z, E,W}.
For strong imitation, the simplified transitions matrix is


3
4
− 1
2M
1
4
0 1
4M
1
4M
0 1
2
1
4
1
4
0
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
1
4M
0 0 1− 1
2M
1
4M
1
4M
0 0 1
4M
1− 1
2M


.
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The resulting stationary distribution is [ 6
5M+23
, 3
5M+23
, 2
5M+23
, 3M+6
5M+23
, 2M+6
5M+23
], which shows that
the frequency of peer excluders is higher than the frequency of peer punishers [see Fig.2(a)].
In the presence of second-order exclusion and punishment, we assume that peer excluders
exclude peer punishers, pure cooperators, and defectors. Similarly, peer punishers punish peer
excluders, pure cooperators, and defectors. The average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
]+
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
k=0
N−i−k−1∑
t=0
(
M−E−W−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
W
t
)(
Y
N−i−k−t−1
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ t + 1)
N − k
− c− tγ]}.
The payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−(N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
]
+
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−1−j∑
t=0
N−j−t−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−Y−Z−W
N−t−k−j−1
)(
W
t
)(
Z
k
)(
Y−1
j
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(N − 1− j − k)
N − k
− tγ]}.
The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
k=0
N−i−j−k−1∑
t=0
(
M−X−W−Y−Z−1
N−i−j−k−t−1
)(
Z
k
)(
X
i
)(
W
t
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [ r(N − j − k)c
N − i− j − k − t
−c− (i+ j + t)cE − tγ].
Finally, the payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)(X + E + Y )β
M − 1
] +
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−X−Y−Z−1
N−i−j−k−1
)(
Z
k
)(
X
i
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(N − j − k)
N − k
− c− (i+ j)β]}.
The transitionmatrix between cooperators, defectors, loners, peer excluders, and peer punishers
in the strong imitation limit is 

1
2
1
4
0 1
4
0
0 1
2
1
4
1
4
0
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
4
3
4


,
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which yields the [0, 0, 0, 1, 0] stationary distribution. As a result, peer excluders prevail, shown in
Fig.2(b).
4 Competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment in the compulsory PGG
Considering the compulsory PGG the probability that no peer excluder is found in the group is
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) .
In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, the average payoff for cooperators is
ΠX = [1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−E−Y−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−1
)
(
M−E−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N
− c]
= rc[1−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (N − 1)Y
(M −E − 1)N
]− c,
while the average payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc(M − 1)(N − 1)(W +X)−N(N − 1)WEγ
N(M − E − 1)(M − 1)
−
(N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
.
The average payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−Y−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc− c− (N − i− 1)cE]
= rc− c−
(N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
.
Last, the payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW = rc− c−
(N − 1)Y β
M − 1
−
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc(M − 1)(N − 1)Y + (N − 1)NEY β
N(M − E − 1)(M − 1)
.
For small mutation rate, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions among cooper-
ators (X), defectors (Y ), peer excluders (E), and peer punishers (W ) is given by


IX
ρXY
3
ρXE
3
ρXW
3
ρY X
3
IY
ρY E
3
ρY W
3
ρEX
3
ρEY
3
IE
ρEW
3
ρWX
3
ρWY
3
ρWE
3
IW


,
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FIG. S2: (Color online) The competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment in the compulsory
PGG. In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment (a), the final frequency of peer excluders
is about two times higher than that of peer punishers, and other two strategists become extinct (a). With
second-order exclusion and punishment, peer excluders win (b). Parameters: N = 5, M = 100, c = 1,
r = 3, cE = 0.4, β = 0.4, and γ = 0.4.
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
3
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, E,W}.
The simplified transition matrix between cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), peer excluders (E),
and peer punishers (W ) in the strong imitation can be given as


2
3
− 2
3M
1
3
1
3M
1
3M
0 2
3
1
3
0
1
3M
0 1− 2
3M
1
3M
1
3M
0 1
3M
1− 2
3M


.
The resulting stationary distribution is [ 1
4+M
, 1
4+M
, 2M+3
12+3M
, M+3
12+3M
], which shows that peer exclud-
ers’ frequency is higher than that of other strategists (see Fig.S2).
If we consider second-order exclusion and punishment, we assume that peer excluders exclude
peer punishers, pure cooperators, and defectors. Simultaneously, peer punishers punish peer ex-
cluders, pure cooperators, and defectors. Accordingly, the payoff for defectors remains unchanged,
but the average payoff for cooperators is changed to
ΠX = −c−
(N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
+
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) {rc(M − 1)[N(M − E − 1)− (N − 1)Y ]−NE(N − 1)Wγ
N(M − 1)(M − E − 1)
}.
13
The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
t=0
(
M−W−Y−X−1
N−i−j−t−1
)(
X
i
)(
W
t
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [ r(N − j)c
N − i− j − t
− c− (i+ j + t)cE − tγ],
while the payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW = −c−
(N − 1)(X + E + Y )β
M − 1
+
(
M−E−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc− (N − 1)Y rc
N(M − E − 1)
−
(N − 1)(M −W −E)β
M −E − 1
+
(N − 1)(X + E + Y )β
M − 1
].
Here the transitions matrix between cooperators, defectors, peer excluders, and peer punishers is


1
3
1
3
1
3
0
0 2
3
1
3
0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1
3
2
3


,
which gives the stationary distribution (0, 0, 1, 0). It suggests that peer excluders prevail as shown
in Fig. S2.
5 Competition between pool exclusion and peer exclusion in the optional PGG
In the optional PGG, the probability that no peer excluder or pool excluder is found in the group
is given by
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) .
In the absence of second-order exclusion, the average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N − k
− c]}.
The average payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y−1
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−F−E−1
N−1
) ric
N − k
.
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The average payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c− δ).
The average payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][rc− c− (N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
].
For small mutation rate, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between coop-
erators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), pool excluders (F ), and peer excluders (E) is given by


IX
ρXY
4
ρXZ
4
ρXF
4
ρXE
4
ρY X
4
IY
ρY Z
4
ρY F
4
ρY E
4
ρZX
4
ρZY
4
IZ
ρZF
4
ρZE
4
ρFX
4
ρFY
4
ρFZ
4
IF
ρFE
4
ρEX
4
ρEY
4
ρEZ
4
ρEF
4
IE


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
4
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, Z, F, E}.
For strong imitation, the transition matrix becomes to


3
4
− 1
4M
1
4
0 0 1
4M
0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
1
4
0 0 1
2
1
4
1
4M
0 0 0 1− 1
4M


.
Accordingly, the stationary distribution is [ 9
25+6M
, 3
25+6M
, 2
25+6M
, 2
25+6M
, 6M+9
25+6M
], and the popula-
tion is dominated by peer excluders (see Fig. 3).
If we consider second-order exclusion, we assume that pool excluders exclude peer excluders
because the latter players do not contribute to the exclusion pool. But peer excluders do not
exclude pool excluders. Accordingly, the average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](−c) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N − k
− c]},
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where
(M−E−F−1N−1 )
(M−1N−1)
denotes the probability that neither peer excluder nor pool excluder is found in
the group. The average payoffs for peer excluders and pool excluders are respectively
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c−
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
(
M−Y−X−1
N−i−j−1
)(
X
i
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (i+ j)cE ]
+
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
N−1−i−k∑
j=0
(
M−X−F−Y−Z−1
N−i−j−k−1
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
j
)(
X
i
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [rc(N − j − k)
N − j − i− k
− c− (i+ j)cE]},
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
N−1∑
k=0
N−1−k∑
j=0
N−1−k−j∑
l=0
(
M−F−Y−Z
N−j−k−l−1
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
j
)(
F−1
l
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc(N − j − k)
l + 1
− c− δ].
The payoffs of loners and defectors are not changed.
For strong imitation, the transitions between cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), pool
excluders (F ), and peer excluders (E) are given by


1
4
1
4
0 1
4
1
4
0 1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
8
0 5
8
1
8
1
8
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
4
3
4


.
Accordingly, the stationary distribution is [0, 0, 0, 1, 0], which shows that pool excluders prevail
(see Fig. 3).
6 Competition between pool exclusion and peer exclusion in the compulsory PGG
In the compulsory PGG, the probability that no peer excluder or no pool excluder is found in
the group is given by
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) .
In the absence of second-order exclusion, the average payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX = [1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−E−F−Y−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N
− c]
= rc[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) (N − 1)Y
N(M −E − F − 1)
]− c.
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The payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−E−F−Y
i
)(
Y−1
N−i−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) rci
N
=
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc
N
(N − 1)(M −E − F − Y )
M − E − F − 1
,
while the average payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF = rc− c− δ.
Last, the average payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE = rc− c−
(N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
.
For small mutation rate, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between coop-
erators (X), defectors (Y ), pool excluders (F ), and peer excluders (E) is given by


IX
ρXY
3
ρXF
3
ρXE
3
ρY X
3
IY
ρY F
3
ρY E
3
ρFX
3
ρFY
3
IF
ρFE
3
ρEX
3
ρEY
3
ρEF
3
IE


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
3
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, F, E}.
For strong imitation, the transition matrix becomes


2
3
− 1
3M
1
3
0 1
3M
0 1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 1
3
1
3
1
3M
0 0 1− 1
3M


.
The resulting stationary distribution is [ 4
3M+11
, 2
3M+11
, 1
3M+11
, 3M+4
3M+11
], which suggests that the pop-
ulation is dominated by peer excluders (see Fig.S3).
In the presence of second-order exclusion, we assume that pool excluders exclude peer exclud-
ers, but peer excluders do not exclude pool excluders. The average payoff for cooperators is given
by
ΠX = [1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](−c) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
(
M−E−F−Y−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N
− c]
=
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) {rc
N
[
(M − Y −E − F − 1)(N − 1)
M − E − F − 1
+ 1]} − c.
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FIG. S3: (Color online) The competition between peer and pool exclusion in the compulsory PGG. In the
absence of second-order exclusion, peer excluders can occupy the whole population, and other strategists
become extinct (a). With second-order exclusion, pool excluders win (b). Parameters: N = 5, M = 100,
c = 1, r = 3, cE = 0.4, and δ = 0.4.
The average payoffs for pool excluders and peer excluders are respectively given by
ΠF =
N−1∑
l=0
N−l−1∑
i=0
(
M−X−E−Y−1
l
)(
Y
N−i−l−1
)(
X+E
i
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ l + 1)
l + 1
− c− δ],
ΠE = [1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)(X + Y )
M − 1
cE ] +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
j=0
(
M−X−F−Y−1
N−j−i−1
)(
Y
j
)(
X
i
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [rc(N − j)
N − i− j
− c− (i+ j)cE].
For strong imitation, the transition matrix is


0 1
3
1
3
1
3
0 1
3
1
3
1
3
0 0 1 0
0 0 1
3
2
3


.
The resulting stationary distribution is [0, 0, 1, 0], namely pool excluders prevail (see Fig. S3).
7 Competition between prosocial exclusions and punishments in the optional PGG
In this case the population contains X cooperators, Y defectors, Z loners, E peer excluders,
W peer punishers, F pool excluders, and V pool punishers whose fractions fulfill the constraint
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X + Y + Z +E +W + F + V = M . In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment,
the average payoff for cooperators is
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N − k
− c]}.
The payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−(N − 1)Wγ + (N − 1)V B
M − 1
] +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−1−j∑
t=0
N−1−j−t∑
k=0
N−1−j−t−k∑
p=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−W−V
N−j−t−k−p−1
)(
W
t
)(
Z
k
)(
V
p
)(
Y−1
j
)
(
M−F−E−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k − 1)c
N − k
− tγ − pB]}.
The average payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][rc− c− (N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
].
The average payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][rc− c− (N − 1)Y β
M − 1
]
+
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
N−i−k−1
)
(
M−F−E−1
N−1
) [rc(i+ 1)
N − k
− c− (N − i− k − 1)β]}.
The average payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c− δ).
Last, the average payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](rc− c−G)
+
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−j−1∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
N−j−k−1
)(
Y
j
)(
Z
k
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k)c
N − k
− c−G]}.
For small exploration rates, the embedded Markov chain describing the transitions between
cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), peer excluders (E), peer punishers (W ), pool excluders
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(F ), and pool punishers (V ) is given by


IX
ρXY
6
ρXZ
6
ρXE
6
ρXW
6
ρXF
6
ρXV
6
ρY X
6
IY
ρY Z
6
ρY E
6
ρY W
6
ρY F
6
ρY V
6
ρZX
6
ρZY
6
IZ
ρZE
6
ρZW
6
ρZF
6
ρZV
6
ρEX
6
ρEY
6
ρEZ
6
IE
ρEW
6
ρEF
6
ρEV
6
ρWX
6
ρWY
6
ρWZ
6
ρWE
6
IW
ρWF
6
ρWV
6
ρFX
6
ρFY
6
ρFZ
6
ρFE
6
ρFW
6
IF
ρFV
6
ρV X
6
ρV Y
6
ρV Z
6
ρV E
6
ρV W
6
ρV F
6
IV


,
where IK = 1−
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
6
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, Z, E,W, F, V }.
For strong imitation, the transitions matrix is


5
6
− 1
3M
1
6
0 1
6M
1
6M
0 0
0 1
2
1
6
1
6
0 1
6
0
1
12
0 7
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
6M
0 0 1− 1
3M
1
6M
0 0
1
6M
0 0 1
6M
1− 1
3M
0 0
1
6
0 0 1
6
1
6
1
2
− 1
6M
1
6M
1
6
0 0 1
6
1
6
1
6M
1
2
− 1
6M


.
Accordingly, the stationary distribution is [ 45
163+35M
, 15
163+35M
, 6
163+35M
, 20M+45
163+35M
, 15M+45
163+35M
,
18M+7
(163+35M)(3M+2)
, 3M+7
(163+35M)(3M+2)
], suggesting that the frequency of peer excluders is higher than
the fraction of any other strategy (see Fig.4).
If we consider the second-order exclusion and punishment, then the average payoff for cooper-
ators is given by
ΠX =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)Wγ
M − 1
−
(N − 1)V B
M − 1
]+
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
t=0
N−1−i−t∑
p=0
N−1−i−t−p∑
k=0
(
M−E−F−V−Y−W−Z−1
i
)(
Y
N−i−t−p−k−1
)(
W
t
)(
V
p
)(
Z
k
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
×[
rc(i+ t+ p+ 1)
N − k
− c− tγ − pB]}.
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The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1 −
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c−
Wγ + V B + (X + Y +W + V )cE
M − 1
(N − 1)] +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
N−1−i−j∑
k=0
N−1−i−j−k∑
p=0
N−1−i−j−k−p∑
t=0
(
M−F−X−W−Y−Z−V−1
N−i−j−k−p−t−1
)(
X
i
)(
Y
j
)(
Z
k
)(
W
t
)(
V
p
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
×[
rc(N − j − k)
N − i− j − k − p− t
− tγ − pB − (i+ j + t + p)cE − c]}.
The average payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c−
(N − 1)
V B + (X + Y + E + F )β
M − 1
] +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
k=0
N−i−j−k−1∑
p=0
(
M−F−X−Z−V−Y−E−1
N−i−j−p−k−1
)(
V
p
)(
X
i
)(
Z
k
)(
Y
j
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
×[
rc(N − j − k)
N − k
− c− (i+ j)β − pB]}.
The average payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]
N−1∑
j=0
N−j−1∑
t=0
N−t−j−1∑
p=0
N−t−j−p−1∑
l=0
(
M−F−Z−V−Y−W
N−t−j−p−l−1
)(
V
p
)(
Y+Z
j
)(
W
t
)(
F−1
l
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
×[
rc(N − j)
l + 1
− c− tγ − pB − δ]}.
Last, the payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV =
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)σ + [1−
(
Z
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ]{[1−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ](−c−G) +
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
j=0
N−j−1∑
k=0
(
Y
j
)(
Z
k
)(
M−E−F−Y−Z−1
N−j−k−1
)
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
) [r(N − j − k)c
N − k
− c−G]}.
For strong imitation limit, the embeddedMarkov chain describing the transitionmatrix between
cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), loners (Z), peer excluders (E), peer punishers (W ), pool excluders
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(F ), and pool punishers (V ) is


1
2
1
6
0 1
6
0 1
6
0
0 1
2
1
6
1
6
0 1
6
0
1
12
0 7
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
1
12
0 0 0 5
6
0 1
6
0
0 0 0 1
6
2
3
1
6
0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
6
0 1
6
2
3


. (1)
The resulting stationary distribution [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] suggests that pool excluders prevail (see
Fig. 4).
8 Competition between prosocial exclusions and punishments in the compulsory PGG
For the compulsory PGG, in the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment the average
payoff for cooperators is given by
ΠX = rc− c−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc(N − 1)Y
N(M − E − F − 1)
.
The payoff for defectors is
ΠY =
(N − 1)(−Wγ − V B)
M − 1
−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [ (N − 1)(−Wγ − V B)
M − 1
−
rc(N − 1)(M − E − F − Y )−N(N − 1)(Wγ + V B)
N(M −E − F − 1)
].
The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE = rc− c−
(N − 1)Y cE
M − 1
.
The payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW = rc− c−
(N − 1)Y β
M − 1
−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc(N − 1)(M − 1)Y −N(E + F )(N − 1)Y β
N(M − 1)(M − E − F − 1)
].
The payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF = rc− c− δ.
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FIG. S4: (Color online) The competition among peer excluders, pool excluders, peer punishers, and pool
punishers in the compulsory PGG. In the absence of second-order exclusion and punishment, peer excluders
can outperform other strategies, and peer punishers can survive in the population (a). With second-order
exclusion and punishment, pool excluders win (b). Parameters: N = 5,M = 100, c = 1, r = 3, cE = 0.4,
δ = 0.4, B = G = 0.4, and β = γ = 0.4.
The payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV = rc− c−G−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) rc
N
(N − 1)Y
M −E − F − 1
.
For small exploration rates, the transition matrix between cooperators (X), defectors (Y ), peer
excluders (E), peer punishers (W ), pool excluders (F ), and pool punishers (V ) is given by


IX
ρXY
5
ρXE
5
ρXW
5
ρXF
5
ρXV
5
ρY X
5
IY
ρY E
5
ρY W
5
ρY F
5
ρY V
5
ρEX
5
ρEY
5
IE
ρEW
5
ρEF
5
ρEV
5
ρWX
5
ρWY
5
ρWE
5
IW
ρWF
5
ρWV
5
ρFX
5
ρFY
5
ρFE
5
ρFW
5
IF
ρFV
5
ρV X
5
ρV Y
5
ρV E
5
ρV W
5
ρV F
5
IV


,
where IK = 1 −
∑
K 6=L
ρKL
5
, and K,L ∈ {X, Y, E,W, F, V }. In the strong imitation limit, the
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transition matrix is 

4
5
− 2
5M
1
5
1
5M
1
5M
0 0
0 3
5
1
5
0 1
5
0
1
5M
0 1− 2
5M
1
5M
0 0
1
5M
0 1
5M
1− 2
5M
0 0
1
5
0 1
5
1
5
2
5
− 1
5M
1
5M
1
5
0 1
5
1
5
1
5M
2
5
− 1
5M


.
Here, the stationary distribution is [ 6
5M+22
, 3
5M+22
, 3M+6
5M+22
, 2M+6
5M+22
, 3M+1
(5M+22)(3M+2)
, 1
(5M+22)(3M+2)
],
which shows that peer excluders has an evolutionary advantage over other strategy individuals
(see Fig. S4).
If we consider the second-order exclusion and punishment, then the average payoff for cooper-
ators is given by
ΠX =
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [ (N − 1)(Wγ + V B)
M − 1)
+ rc−
rc(N − 1)Y
(M −E − F − 1)N
−
(N − 1)(V B +Wγ)
M −E − F − 1
]
−c−
(N − 1)(V B +Wγ)
M − 1
.
The payoff for peer excluders is
ΠE = [1−
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) ][−c− (N − 1)(X + Y +W + V )cE + (N − 1)(Wγ + V B)
M − 1
] +
(
M−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
N−1∑
i=0
N−1−i∑
j=0
N−1−i−j∑
p=0
N−1−i−j−p∑
t=0
(
M−F−X−W−Y−V−1
N−i−j−p−t−1
)(
X
i
)(
Y
j
)(
W
t
)(
V
p
)
(
M−F−1
N−1
) [ rc(N − j)
N − i− j − p− t
−
tγ − pB − (i+ j + t+ p)cE − c].
The payoff for peer punishers is
ΠW = −c−
(N − 1)(X + Y + E + F )β + (N − 1)V B
M − 1
−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) {−(N − 1)(X + Y + E + F )β + (N − 1)V B
M − 1
− rc+
rc
N
(N − 1)Y
M −E − F − 1
+
(N − 1)[(X + Y )β + V B]
M −E − F − 1
}.
The payoff for pool excluders is
ΠF =
N−1∑
i=0
N−i−1∑
j=0
N−i−j−1∑
p=0
N−i−j−p−1∑
t=0
(
M−E−X−Y−W−V−1
N−i−j−p−t−1
)(
X+E
i
)(
Y
j
)(
V
p
)(
W
t
)
(
M−1
N−1
)
×[
r(N − j)c
N − i− j − p− t
− c− δ − tγ − pB].
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Last, the payoff for pool punishers is
ΠV = −c−G−
(
M−E−F−1
N−1
)
(
M−1
N−1
) [rc
N
(N − 1)Y
M − E − F − 1
− rc].
In the strong imitation limit the transition matrix is given by


2
5
1
5
1
5
0 1
5
0
0 3
5
1
5
0 1
5
0
0 0 4
5
0 1
5
0
0 0 1
5
3
5
1
5
0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1
5
0 1
5
3
5


.
The resulting stationary distribution is [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0], which suggests that pool excluders win (see
Fig. S4).
9 Robustness of main findings
In the last section we present some representative examples to illustrate that our main findings
are robust and remain valid in a broad range of model parameters. First, in Fig. S5 we show the
result of competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment strategies in the optional PGG
for a significantly larger β = 0.7 fine value. Note that here the fine is almost two times higher
than the punishment cost. Still, excluder strategy remains dominant in the absence of second-order
sanctioning for almost all imitation strength values. If the second-order punishment and exclusion
are possible then peer exclusion prevails again, as shown in the right panel of Fig. S5.
In agreement with our previous findings the superiority of peer exclusion remains intact no
matter how the fine is increased relevantly in the presence of pool strategies. A typical outcome is
shown in Fig. S6 where in most of the time the majority of individuals prefer peer exclusion even
if pool strategies are possible in the absence of second order sanctioning. If the latter is possible
then pool exclusion prevails, as it is demonstrated in the right panel of Fig. S6.
Our last figure illustrates the frequencies of available strategies by choosing different group
sizes for the public goods game. Both panels of Fig. S7 highlight that group size has no significant
role in the competition of strategies no matter whether second-order sanctioning is considered or
not.
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FIG. S5: (Color online) The competition between peer exclusion and peer punishment in the optional PGG
for a larger punishment fine β = 0.7. In the absence of second-order sanctioning, shown in panel (a), both
strategies survive but peer exclusion dominates. If second-order exclusion and punishment are applied then
peer excluders prevail, as shown in panel (b). Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1,
M = 100, cE = 0.4, and γ = 0.4.
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FIG. S6: (Color online) The competition between different types of social exclusion and costly punishment
in the optional PGG for a large punishment fine β = 0.7. When strategies can penalize defectors only,
shown in panel (a), then all strategies coexist in time average for weak strength of imitation, but in most of
the time peer excluders form the majority of the population for other imitation strength values. Panel (b)
shows the case when second-order sanctioning is present. Here pool excluders prevail and dominate the
whole population. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1,M = 100, cE = δ = 0.4, γ = 0.4,
and B = G = 0.4.
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FIG. S7: (Color online) The competition between different types of social exclusion and costly punishment
in the optional PGG as a function of the group size N for imitation strength κ = 0.1. It is shown that group
size has no significant role in the competition of strategies no matter whether second-order sanctioning is
considered or not. Parameters: r/N = 0.6, c = 1, µ = 10−6, σ = 1, M = 100, cE = δ = 0.4,
β = γ = 0.4, and B = G = 0.4.
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